What came to your mind as soon as the coup took place?  Did you consider coming back at once?

There was no need to return to Nigeria because someone else had taken over my appointment. People would have my return a different angle and misinterpreted it that I knew about the coup. So it was a good thing that I was not at home even though I was always in touch with events at home on the telephone. Unfortunately, the chap that took over from me as chief of staff was killed in the January coup. Possibly, if I were to be home then, I could have been killed too. However in July 1966 when we were about to go on world tour at the Imperial Defence College, which is an annual event, the army coup had already taken place in Nigeria. Ironsi had already taken over since January.  I felt that as a Nigerian senior officer on that course, I should come home just to acquaint myself with the foreign policy of my country before going on that course. Therefore, I called Ogundipe, who was the chief of general staff. I called Ironsi to let him know that I was coming home before I proceeded on that course. All the other senior officers before me had been on that course. And they agreed with me that I should come home. On the night of 28th of July, I got here on the morning of 29th and accommodated in a particular guesthouse. From there, I started visiting all my friends that I left behind six months ago and I ended up with my uncle, Chief Adeyemi, who  was an architect living on Ribadu road. Our discussions took us far into the night and he prevailed on me to spend the night, even though I had hardly had a change of clothing. In the morning, a coup had taken place and I was made to understand that the soldiers had even visited that guest house, probably with a mind to kill me. It came as a shock that a lot of the senior military officers had been killed. What I did then was to consult with very senior people in the society like Adetokunbo Ademola, Chief Majekodunmi. From those consultations, it became clear to me that I had become the most senior military officer to come from the West of Nigeria, but I thought that it was wrong of me to take the reins of power even though there were several appeals from a lot of people. In the meanwhile, General Gowon  was hiding somewhere at the Ikeja cantonment, and this was why it dawned on us all that as the most senior military officer from the North, he was likely to be head of state. With all due respects, that coup was not an Ibo coup despite the fact that most of the  officers and men who took part in it were Ibo. Because of that, there were wild speculations thereby, that there was going to be a Hausa counter-coup. Unfortunately, when it did take place, it had wider implications because even those who were not Ibo were also killed. But I think that that coup took place because six months after, Ironsi didn’t take disciplinary action on those who started it all. My opinion now is that Ironsi really didn’t know what to do especially as he hadn’t commanded either British or Nigerian troop before he became head of state. I think he was being slow to take action because he was being careful, such that when the second coup took place, people thought it was planned and executed by northerners. So even when there was pressure on me to take power, I refused even though I knew that the north was sponsoring Gowon, who was my junior in the army.  So as a full colonel, I decided to step down and go to the West, on the 4th of August 1966.  When I got to the West as governor, the first thing I did was find the bodies of both Ironsi and Fajuyi and give then proper burials. Thereafter, work in the West started. I was there as governor for four years and eight months.

 

What was one significant thing that happened in your time as governor?

Because I was formerly a chief of army staff at defense headquarters, I knew exactly what was going on in the West, starting from 1962 Majekodunmi as emergency administrator. The first thing I did was go round to know the terrain and know the people.  On the day I was going to see the Ooni, Aderemi Adesoji I was a bit late. All the important chiefs at the Ife Junction were dressed in their finest but were sweating profusely. From that moment on, I abolished the practice of traditional rulers coming outside of their palaces to Ife junction to meet the governor. From that moment also, governors, presidents and administrators now go to the palaces of traditional rulers instead of the other way round.

 

Because of allegations of mismanagement of resources under the military, would you have preferred that the military never participated in government?

There shouldn’t have been military participation in government in the first place. But since there was military government, I don’t agree that there was mismanagement in my own time. But if you are talking about now, maybe there was some of it. On the whole, I don’t think there was something like that. Talking about mism

anagement, it would be unfair to talk about mismanagement. Even in the government before us there were cases of mismanagement, they were inefficient. And the reason why you cannot blame us was that we were military people who had no training in these things. So we should not say there$was mismancgement. We should rather be talking about ‘dull moments’ or that we were not partaking in the profession that we were trained for. 

 

But if you say that there was no mismanagement, how do you account for General Abdulsalaam’s assertion that past military governors were corrupt apart from two of them?

He meant me and somebody else, and I thank God for that. Well, what the problem was, is that General Gowon stayed in power too long, for 12 years. If a coup against him took place, it must have taken place as a result of either of two things. One, if his officers wanted to go on their own, wanted to run things on their own. Two, if there was mismanagement. But I think the whole thing boils down to Gowon’s pace. He was becoming slow, especially when the civilians were already itching to participate in running government.

 

But do you agree that Generals Rotimi and Mobolaji-Johnson were also clean?

As far as I am concerned they were. But if there were any instances of corruption or mismanagement in those days, it was very minimal. I was never involved and I don’t think either my predecessors or successors were involved.

 

If you say they were not involved in any mismanagement, what happened to all those funds that General Gowon said he had no idea how to spend?

I would say that is a bit unfair a statement to make. I thought that I had just answered the question a while ago. There wasn’t much money then and the problem of the country was much more that the money that could go around then. And the military was able to as much as they could with the money that came in. Some were slow, no doubt, probably because it was not a profession they were trained for.  You must also realize that the military did not rule alone. When I was governor of the West, I had 12 commissioners and knowing the politics of the West then, most of them were Awolowo supporters who was in prison. I guess that support has its basis from the great work he had done as premier of the West and somebody who showed leadership. So the monies coming in then were used judiciously, judging from the many problems that were on ground. There were problems of water, road construction, hospitals, and electricity. Take for instance in Ekiti where I come from – there was only one hospital in the whole Western region when I was there but when I was leaving there were eight. I called them cottage hospitals which were now turned into general hospitals. So the whole thing depends on the individuals in power. I come from Ekiti, I know their problems and which ones to accord priority and I did my best according to the priorities. That why people are happy with what I did in the West, not just in Ekiti alone.

 

You said that your successors continued with your policies. What do you make of the reversal of the Obasanjo’s policies by his successor?

In many instances of government in any country, most leaders do what they do according to the dictates of their conscience. Even though there are many things to handle that are difficult, leaders are wont to do things according to their conscience and according to how you view things. When Yar’Adua took over, he must have seen some defectives in the performance of Obasanjo and he had to reverse them. Don’t forget also that Yar’Adua has advisers who may advise on what the former president had done rightly or wrongly, to assist him start his own programmes. So the question of reversing or not reversing is a question of time; how you see things and it is a question of your ability to change those decisions.

 

Don’t you think that the reversal of a predecessor’s policies is an indictment on the business of government in Nigeria?

Not really. Nigeria has changed tremendously from what it used to be. There are many problems of ethnicity. People want things to be done in their own areas as they think are done in their own areas. And if the president then didn’t do what they felt should have been done, they would complain, naturally. It depends on what that president put on the ground. It depends on his priorities as a president which may not be priority to the people. So if the incumbent president reverses some of the things Obasanjo did, he may have done that because he may have found some loopholes in the way they were handled. We must not make the mistake to use our problems in the west as benchmark for the problems of the whole country.  We must realize that there are many countries in Nigeria. So you can’t satisfy everyone in the country all at once. Nevertheless, if the president gets his priorities right, if he doesn’t take decisions in a hurry, if he has good advisers telling him what to do, there are chances that policies will not get reversed. When Yar’Adua leaves tomorrow you may find the next man thinking twice about his programmes if he thinks otherwise.  But the main problem that Obasanjo had was in the way he was handling things.  People thought that he was doing things militarily, not listening to anybody. Well maybe that’s his nature.